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ABSTRACT
Objective To determine whether observable changes in
waiting times occurred for certain key elective procedures
between 1997 and 2007 in the English National Health
Service and to analyse the distribution of those changes
between socioeconomic groups as an indicator of equity.
Design Retrospective study of population-wide, patient
level data using ordinary least squares regression to
investigate the statistical relation between waiting times
and patients’ socioeconomic status.
Setting English NHS from 1997 to 2007.
Participants 427277 patients who had elective knee
replacement, 406253 who had elective hip replacement,
and 2568318 who had elective cataract repair.
Main outcome measures Days waited from referral for
surgery to surgery itself; socioeconomic status based on
Carstairs index of deprivation.
ResultsMean and median waiting times rose initially and
then fell steadily over time. By 2007 variation in waiting
times across the population tended to be lower. In 1997
waiting times and deprivation tended to be positively
related. By 2007 the relation between deprivation and
waiting time was less pronounced, and, in some cases,
patients from the most deprived fifth were waiting less
time than patients from the most advantaged fifth.
Conclusions Between 1997 and 2007 waiting times for
patients having elective hip replacement, knee
replacement, and cataract repair in England went down
and the variation in waiting times for those procedures
across socioeconomic groups was reduced. Many people
feared that the government’s NHS reforms would lead to
inequity, but inequitywith respect towaiting timesdid not
increase; if anything, it decreased. Although proving that
the later stages of those reforms, which included patient
choice, provider competition, and expanded capacity,
was a catalyst for improvements in equity is impossible,
the data show that these reforms, at a minimum, did not
harm equity.
INTRODUCTION
Until recently, hospital waiting times were viewed as
an important problem for the National Health
Service.1 However, over the past 10 years, as the gov-
ernment in England increased the supply of doctors,
increased funding for the health service, set rigid wait-
ing time targets, and (more recently) introduced mar-
ket based reforms, waiting times have dropped
considerably. Yet, whereas NHS waiting times are
widely accepted to have fallen between 1997 and
2007, little is known about whether the drop in waiting
times has been equitably distributed with respect to
socioeconomic status.One of themain fears associated
with the later stages of these reforms—which included
increased choice for patients, the use of treatment pro-
viders from the independent sector, and competition
between providers—was whether any improvements
in quality or drops in waiting times would come at
the expense of equity.2-4
We used population-wide, patient level data to exam-
ine the extent of any observable changes in waiting
times for certain key elective procedures between
1997 and 2007 and to analyse the distribution of those
changes between socioeconomic groups. We relate
these changes to three distinct periods in government
policy during that time: a period from 1997 to 2000
when the government focused onwaiting lists, not wait-
ing times, and moderately increased funding; a period
from2001 to2004when funding increaseddramatically
and the government focused on targets and perfor-
mance management; and a period from 2005 to 2007
when the government expanded supply and introduced
patient choice and provider competition.56
METHODS
We examined patient level, national hospital activity
data for day cases and inpatient cases in England from
1 January 1997 to 31 December 2007. The Dr Foster
Unit at Imperial College London processed and
cleaned the data before passing them toDrFoster Intel-
ligence in an anonymised form. We examined three
common, high volume elective surgical procedures
that all had chronically long waiting times: knee repla-
cement (OPCS4 codes W40.1, W41.1, and W42.1),
hip replacement (OPCS4 codes W37.1, W38.1, and
W39.1), and cataract repair (OPCS4 code C71.2). We
looked at non-revision cases for all three procedures.
Observations were limited to patients seeking elec-
tive care from their usual place of residence. Observa-
tions were excluded if they had any missing data fields
—for example, if the month or year the patient was
treated, the patient’s deprivation status, or the patient’s
age was missing. No correlation existed between miss-
ing data and area, deprivation, year, or patient’s age;
any missing data seemed to be the result of coding
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errors, which were random. We also excluded obser-
vations for which a patient’s waiting time was greater
than three years.We assumed that any casewith await-
ing time greater than three years was atypical and
should not be reflected in a macro analysis of waiting
times.
The data retain individual patients’ postcodes
(which are removed before delivery to Dr Foster Intel-
ligence). This allows observations to be linked to
patients’ local area characteristics. We calculated
deprivation by using the 2001Carstairs index of depri-
vation at the output area level and broke the level of
deprivation into population fifths. The Carstairs index
of deprivation is a composite deprivation index based
on car ownership, unemployment, overcrowding, and
social class within output areas, calculated by the
Office of National Statistics.7 The Carstairs index
serves as our proxy for patients’ socioeconomic status.
In our study, deprivation 1 was the least deprived fifth
and deprivation 5 was the most deprived fifth.
Waiting times weremeasured as the time fromwhen
thepatientwas referredby a specialist for surgery to the
time the patient actually had surgery. We thus mea-
sured time from the decision to admit until the actual
surgery, irrespective of what happened in between.
This method is quite different from the reported wait-
ing time method used by the English Department of
Health. For instance, Department of Health figures
will reset the waiting time to zero if a patient does not
attend or declines a reasonable offer of admission.
Equally, if a patient is unwell or unfit for surgery, this
time is subtracted from their waiting time.
We calculated mean and median waiting times for
each year and each procedure.We used t tests andWil-
coxon signed rank tests to determine whether a statis-
tically significant difference in mean and median
waiting times existed for the periods of 1997-2000,
2001-4, and 2005-7. Those three periods roughly cor-
respond to what have been labelled as the three stages
of government policy to tackle waiting times, as noted
above.5 We used analysis of variance and non-para-
metric rank tests to determine whether a statistically
significant intra-year variation in waiting times existed
between fifths of deprivation.
Finally, we used ordinary least squares regression
with robust standard errors to determine whether
patients’ deprivation level was associated with waiting
times, controlling for the patients’ age, sex, area type
(city, town and fringe, hamlet and isolated dwelling,
and village), and the year of procedure.We ran regres-
sions on data from three periods that corresponded to
changing government policy (1997-2000, 2001-4, and
2005-7) independently.5
No individual patientswere identifiable in this study.
All data were presented in aggregate form. The
Stata10-SE software package was used for statistical
analysis.
RESULTS
The total number of observations comprised 444 867
knee replacements, 423 203 hip replacements, and
2 647 235 cataract repairs. In total, 3.8% (16 856) of
knee replacement observations, 3.9% (16 416) of hip
replacement observations, and 3.0% (78 440) of catar-
act procedure observations were excluded for missing
data. We excluded 734 knee replacement procedures,
534 hip replacement procedures, and 477 cataract pro-
cedures because they had waiting times greater than
three years. After these amendments, the observations
were limited to 427 227 knee replacements, 406 253
hip replacements, and 2 568 318 cataract repairs done
in English NHS patients between 1997 and 2007.
For all three procedures, mean and median waiting
times rose initially and then steadily fell (fig 1). How-
ever, what is of particular interest for our purposes is
what happened towaiting times brokendownby socio-
economic status, as measured by the Carstairs index of
deprivation. Figure 2 shows mean waiting times for all
three procedures, broken down by deprivation. In
1997 deprivation and waiting time tended to be posi-
tively related—the greater the degree of deprivation,
the longer the waiting time. By 2007 waiting times
were much more uniformly distributed across the
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Fig 1 | Mean and median waiting times for knee replacement,
hip replacement, and cataract repair
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spectrum of deprivation; for cataract repair and knee
replacement, the distribution had actually reversed to
show a negative relation between waiting time and
deprivation.
We found a statistically significant difference inwait-
ing times for each procedure between each of our three
periods (P<0.001) determined by t tests andWilcoxon
sign rank tests. Statistical significance at this level was
maintainedwith a Bonferroni correction to account for
the possibility of random events occurring over the
study time period. We found a statistically significant
intra-year variation in waiting times between depriva-
tion groups for all three procedures for all years, except
hip replacements in 2005 and 2006, measured with
analysis of variance and Kruskal-Wallis rank tests
(P<0.05).
We used ordinary least squares regression to estab-
lish the relation between waiting times and fifths of
deprivation over the three time periods. Tables 1, 2,
and 3 summarise the results for the three procedures.
As can be seen from the β coefficients on the socioeco-
nomic status variables for each time period, the rela-
tion between waiting times and the deprivation fifths
also changed over time. Each unit increase in the β
coefficient represents a one day increase in waits. For
all three procedures, each successive time period was
associated with a statistically significant reduction in
waiting times. More interestingly, less variation in
waiting times existed across socioeconomic groups
over time. For example, for hip replacement surgery
in 1997-2000 each successive increase in deprivation
fifth was associated with a statistically significant
increase in waiting time of between one and two
weeks compared with the least deprived fifth
(P<0.001). In 2001-4 variations in waiting times
between deprivation fifths tended to be large and sig-
nificant. Each procedure showed a modified U shaped
distribution, with the middle fifths waiting the longest
for care. In 2005-7 very little difference existed in days
waited dependingonpatients’deprivation fifth. In fact,
patients from the most deprived fifth having either a
knee replacement or a cataract repair waited less time
than patients from the least deprived fifth (P<0.05).
DISCUSSION
Between 1997 and 2007, waiting times for elective
knee replacements, hip replacements, and cataract
repairs dropped significantly and equity, measured as
the variation in waiting times according to socioeco-
nomic status, improved. Waiting times and waiting
lists have long been a concern in the NHS, particularly
for high volume, elective surgical procedures such as
knee replacements, hip replacements, and cataract
repairs. However, as waiting times have dropped
Table 1 | Regression coefficients for knee replacements
1997-2000 2001-4 2005-7
β coefficient (95% CI) T statistic β coefficient (95% CI) T statistic β coefficient (95% CI) T statistic
Deprivation fifth:
2 6.92 (3.34 to 10.51)*** 3.78 2.22 (−0.23 to 4.67) 1.78 0.44 (−1.02 to 1.91) 0.59
3 12.41 (8.77 to 16.05)*** 6.68 7.14 (4.66 to 9.63)*** 5.63 1.76 (0.26 to 3.27)* 2.29
4 13.86 (10.16 to 17.57)*** 7.34 6.89 (4.32 to 9.47)*** 5.24 0.99 (−0.59 to 2.57) 1.23
5 6.23 (2.30 to 10.17)** 3.11 −7.75 (−10.52 to −4.98)*** −5.49 −2.74 (−4.49 to −0.99)*** −3.07
Female sex 3.76 (1.56 to 5.97)** 3.35 2.57 (1.02 to 4.12)** 3.25 2.30 (1.34 to 3.27)*** 4.67
Age:
50s 22.23 (14.11 to 30.36)*** 5.36 14.79 (9.25 to 20.33)*** 5.23 6.68 (3.54 to 9.83)*** 4.17
60s 32.43 (24.91 to 39.96)*** 8.45 19.39 (14.20 to 24.59)*** 7.32 5.71 (2.76 to 8.65)*** 3.79
70s 28.77 (21.33 to 36.22)*** 7.58 16.97 (11.82 to 22.12)*** 6.46 5.83 (2.91 to 8.76)*** 3.91
80s 19.74 (11.93 to 27.55)*** 4.95 12.96 (7.55 to 18.36)*** 4.70 5.59 (2.49 to 8.69)*** 3.54
Year:
1998 27.16 (24.05 to 30.27)*** 17.12 NA NA NA NA
1999 26.06 (23.01 to 29.12)*** 16.70 NA NA NA NA
2000 35.00 (31.95 to 38.05)*** 22.48 NA NA NA NA
2002 NA NA −9.48 (−12.10 to −6.85)*** −7.07 NA NA
2003 NA NA −33.74 (−36.18 to −31.30)*** −27.05 NA NA
2004 NA NA −72.74 (−75.08 to −70.40)*** −60.85 NA NA
2006 NA NA NA NA −25.85 (−27.13 to −24.58)*** −39.76
2007 NA NA NA NA −48.56 (−49.78 to −47.35)*** −78.46
Observations 103 492 NA 162 317 NA 161 468 NA
R2 0.017 NA 0.051 NA 0.067 NA
NA=not applicable.
Model run with robust standard errors; deprivation fifth 1 serves as reference category for deprivation, male is reference category for sex, and under 50 years is reference category for age;
model also controls for area type (city, town, hamlet and isolated dwelling, village) and provider type (private, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital, traditional NHS);
dependent variable=waiting time for knee replacement, measured in days.
*P<0.05.
**P<0.01.
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over the past decade, examining whether the reduc-
tions in waiting times have produced equitable results
at a national level is worthwhile. Previous research has
shown that greater deprivation is associated with
longer waits in Scotland, and a small scale study of
4309 patients in England from April 2000 to 2001
found some inequity in the distribution of waiting
times.8 9
The government’s policies to target waiting times in
England can largely be broken down into three peri-
ods: one between 1997 and 2000, a second from 2001
to 2004, and a third from 2005 to 2007.5 68 During the
1997-2000 period, the government focused on redu-
cing the number of patients onwaiting lists (as opposed
to waiting times), a modest increase in funding
occurred, operational and technical support for redu-
cing waiting lists increased, and the rhetoric of govern-
ment policy shifted from an emphasis on competition
to one on cooperation and collaboration. However,
after two years of attempting to shorten waits, waiting
times had risen, not fallen, a policy failure forwhich the
then secretary of state for health, Frank Dobson, took
personal responsibility and issued a national
apology.10 The second waiting time policy period,
from 2001 to 2004, saw dramatic increases in funding
and the implementation of waiting time targets
coupled with performance management as part of a
command and control policy labelled by Bevan and
Hood as “targets and terror;” it also saw the planting
of the seeds of choice and competition and expanded
supply as outlined in the NHS plan.11-13 This period of
targets and centralisation was associated with reduc-
tions in waiting times in comparison with Scotland,
which abandoned targets during this period.14 The
final period of government policy from 2005 to 2007
centred on expanding the capacity in the system,
increasing the use of providers from the private sector,
and introducing greater choice for patients and compe-
tition between providers. Throughout the second half
of 2004 patients waiting more than six months for care
were given a choice of attending an alternative provi-
der that had a shorter waiting time; in 2005 patients
having cataract repair generally had a choice of four
or more providers, and beginning in early 2006 the
aim was for almost all patients to have a choice of
four or more providers at their point of referral.15-17
This period was also associated with a continuing fall
in waiting times, despite a dramatic rise in overall
activity.9
Given the plethora of reforms aimed at reducing
waiting times introduced between 1997 and 2007 in
England, ascribing the drop in waiting times that
occurred after 2000 to one policy reform rather than
another is difficult. The rise in funding, the rigid gov-
ernment targets, and increased choice and competition
are all likely to have played a role together in shorten-
ing patients’waits. The focus of this study, however, is
less on the overall reduction of waiting times andmore
on how the relation between deprivation and waiting
times has changed over the past decade. In addition to
reducing waits and improving quality, the govern-
ment, along with several policy makers and advisers
close to government, argued that the reforms, espe-
cially those associated with choice for patients, would
be a vehicle to improve equity.16 18 19 They argued that
in health services without formalised choice, some
form of privilege always exists for middle class and
upper class users, who use their “voice” to negotiate
for better services within the publicly funded service
or can afford to access care in the private sector.18
Creating formal choice in the health service, the gov-
ernment argued, would give all patients greater power
to affect their use of resources, irrespective of their
socioeconomic status, as well as providing a more effi-
cient system formatching supply to demand. Likewise,
the argumentwas that themarket based reformswould
improve allocative efficiency and drive down the long
waits that were felt by poor people in particular.20
In contrast, several analysts argued that the expan-
sion of choice for patients and competition between
providers would not only not improve equity but
would harm it.2-4 Among other lines of their argument,
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Fig 2 | Mean waiting times for knee replacement, hip replacement, and cataract repair, by
deprivation fifth
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critics of choice and competition have argued that bet-
ter off people were better equipped to choose and that
the reforms would produce incentives to focus on
wealthy people to the detriment of the poor. Hence, a
belief existed that proponents of the government’s
reforms had overlooked the possibly serious negative
impact that choice and competition could have on
equity.4
Although initial results from the pilot of choice in
London suggested that little or no difference existed
in the take up of choice by different social classes, no
aggregate evidence has been available on whether the
reforms have harmed or improved equity.21 Our
results show that during the period after the reforms
were introduced, waiting times for knee replacement,
hip replacement, and cataract repair continued to fall
and the variation in waiting times between fifths of
deprivation was reduced. Hence, contrary to critics’
fears, by 2007 patients’ deprivation had little impact
on their waiting times. In certain circumstances, by
2007 patients in more deprived areas were waiting
less time than patients from less deprived areas.
Our findings do not allow us to state with confidence
what policy mechanisms led to reductions in waiting
times and improvements in equity. It would be inap-
propriate to conclude that, for instance, increased
choice and competition led to improvements in equity.
What we can assert with confidence, however, is that
the introduction of choice and competition, as well as
the other post-2000 government reforms, did not lead
to the inequitable distribution of waiting times across
socioeconomic groups that many people had pre-
dicted. As the government continues to emphasise
the importance of choice and competition in England,
these findings should be incorporated into the discus-
sion of whether these reforms will necessarily lead to
various types of inequalities.22
Limitations
This study has several limitations. Firstly, the Carstairs
index of deprivation is one of several ways of measur-
ing socioeconomic status. Most of the indices are sig-
nificantly correlated, but our measure is accurate only
at the level of the output area.7 It therefore cannot pick
up deprivation of individual patients but rather the
deprivation level of the area in which the patient lives.
Secondly, as stated, given the number of policy pro-
cesses happening at the same time, proving that one
element of the reforms rather than another caused
either the drop in waiting times or the improvement
in equity is difficult. This analysis was largely a descrip-
tive analysis, so we have been careful not to ascribe
causation.
Table 2 | Regression coefficients for hip replacements
1997-2000 2001-4 2005-7
β coefficient (95% CI) T statistic β coefficient (95% CI) T statistic β coefficient (95% CI) T statistic
Deprivation fifth:
2 10.92 (8.08 to 13.77)*** 7.52 10.06 (7.77 to 12.356)*** 8.6 1.78 (0.28 to 3.28)* 2.32
3 16.49 (13.56 to 19.43)*** 11.00 12.70 (10.35 to 15.05)*** 10.59 3.08 (1.54 to 4.62)*** 3.93
4 23.26 (20.18 to 26.35)*** 14.80 17.75 (15.24 to 20.25)*** 13.88 3.05 (1.34 to 4.69)*** 3.62
5 19.73 (16.33 to 23.12)*** 11.40 9.42 (6.63 to 12.21)*** 6.61 2.12 (0.23 to 4.02)* 2.19
Female sex −7.61 (−9.55 to −5.68)** −7.71 −7.02 (−8.58 to −5.45)*** −8.78 −1.54 (−2.59 to −0.48)* −2.86
Age:
50s 13.26 (8.58 to 17.95)** 5.55 6.91 (3.01 to 10.81)** 3.47 3.24 (0.68 to 5.80)* 2.48
60s 7.16 (2.93 to 11.39)** 3.31 4.09 (0.55 to 7.62)* 2.26 0.10 (−2.22 to 2.42) 0.08
70s −3.74 (−7.93 to 0.45) −1.75 −4.62 (−8.13 to −1.10)* −2.57 −2.32 (−4.61 to −0.03)* −1.99
80s −19.17 (−23.77 to −14.57)*** −8.17 −17.98 (−21.84 to −14.13)*** −9.14 −6.92 (−9.46 to −4.39)*** −5.35
Year:
1998 20.75 (18.17 to 23.33)*** 15.74 NA NA NA NA
1999 22.45 (19.87 to 25.03)*** 17.06 NA NA NA NA
2000 34.20 (31.58 to 36.81)*** 25.65 NA NA NA NA
2002 NA NA −3.19 (−5.66 to −0.72) −2.53 NA NA
2003 NA NA −20.21 (−22.52 to −17.89) −17.12 NA NA
2004 NA NA −52.92 (−55.13 to −50.71) −46.99 NA NA
2006 NA NA NA NA −21.72 (−23.06 to −20.38)*** −31.76
2007 NA NA NA NA −42.46 (−43.74 to −41.19)*** −65.46
Observations 122 264 NA 156 220 NA 127 769
R2 0.019 NA 0.036 NA 0.057
NA=not applicable.
Model run with robust standard errors; deprivation fifth 1 serves as reference category for deprivation, male is reference category for sex, and under 50 years is reference category for age;
model also controls for area type (city, town, hamlet and isolated dwelling, village) and provider type (private, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital, traditional NHS);
dependent variable=waiting time for hip replacement, measured in days.
*P<0.05.
**P<0.01.
***P<0.001.
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Thirdly, these data are cross sectional, and the
patients’ characteristics varied from year to year
depending on who was referred for care. Therefore,
variation exists in our samples over time. We are
unable, for instance, to determine whether patients
elected to use the private sector and this loss of demand
for public provision led to a decrease in waits.
Although this is unlikely, it should nevertheless be
taken into account. Likewise, this study looks at equity
with reference to use of services not with reference to
access.
Fourthly, this analysis is focused on three particular
surgical procedures—knee replacement, hip replace-
ment, and cataract repair. Together, the three proce-
dures account for between 6% and 7% of total
elective surgical activity. Although we have no reason
to believe that the patterns seen for these elective pro-
cedures are unique,we have nomeans of knowingwith
certainty that waiting times for all other elective surgi-
cal procedures have followed the same trends.
Fifthly, this analysis relies on administrative data.
Such data are relatively easy to acquire, encompass
the whole English population, and are computer read-
able. However, possible shortcomings include data
miscoding, missing data, and few measures of process
quality. However, missing data ormiscoding would be
unlikely to lead to the clear, consistent, and statistically
significant results that we have observed.
We thank the Dr Foster Unit at Imperial College London for processing the
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original dataset and comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
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Table 3 | Regression coefficients for cataract repair
1997-2000 2001-4 2005-7
β coefficient (95% CI) T statistic β coefficient (95% CI) T statistic β coefficient (95% CI) T statistic
Deprivation fifth:
2 3.18 (2.04 to 4.33)*** 5.44 2.28 (1.54 to 3.02)*** 6.02 −0.57 (−0.93 to −0.20)** −3.03
3 5.28 (4.14 to 6.43)*** 9.05 3.81 (3.07 to 4.56)*** 10.02 0.13 (−0.24 to 0.51) 0.69
4 6.27 (5.11 to 7.43)*** 10.58 2.56 (1.80 to 3.31)*** 6.61 −0.52 (−0.91 to −0.14)** −2.7
5 3.97 (2.78 to 5.16)*** 6.55 −5.53 (−6.31 to −4.76)*** −13.98 −3.52 (−3.90 to −3.13)*** −17.92
Female sex 12.75 (12.06 to 13.44)*** 36.19 9.14 (8.69 to 9.60)*** 39.59 3.63 (3.41 to 3.86)*** 31.62
Age:
50s −2.43 (−4.26 to −0.59)* −2.59 −10.05 (−11.28 to −8.83*** −16.09 −3.70 (−4.345 to −3.06)*** −11.28
60s 14.77 (13.30 to 16.24)*** 19.72 0.23 (−0.77 to 1.23) 0.46 −2.89 (−3.42 to −2.35)*** −10.63
70s 24.73 (23.41 to 26.06)*** 36.64 8.62 (7.70 to 9.53)*** 18.44 −2.04 (−2.54 to −1.54)*** −8.01
80s 27.83 (26.49 to 29.18)*** 40.54 14.41 (13.48 to 15.34)*** 30.41 0.39 (−0.11 to 0.90) 1.52
Year:
1998 0.15 (-0.99 to 1.28) 0.26 NA NA NA NA
1999 −4.15 (−6.28 to −2.02)*** −3.84 NA NA NA NA
2000 −5.74 (−7.04 to −4.44)*** −8.67 NA NA NA NA
2002 NA NA −3.39 (−4.13 to −2.64)*** −8.90 NA NA
2003 NA NA −20.75 (−21.45 to −20.05)*** −58.34 NA NA
2004 NA NA −75.34 (−75.97 to −74.71)*** −234.55 NA NA
2006 NA NA NA NA −0.99 (−1.27 to −0.71)*** −6.95
2007 NA NA NA NA −0.80 (−1.09 to −0.51)*** −5.46
Observations 703 827 NA 1 049 919 NA 814 572 NA
R2 0.0250 NA 0.093 NA 0.006 NA
NA=not applicable.
Model run with robust standard errors; deprivation fifth 1 serves as reference category for deprivation, male is reference category for sex, and under 50 years is reference category for age;
model also controls for area type (city, town, hamlet and isolated dwelling, village) and provider type (private, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital, traditional NHS);
dependent variable=waiting time for cataract repair, measured in days.
*P<0.05.
**P<0.01.
***P<0.001.
WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC
Little recent evidence exists on the association between
waiting timesand individual patients’ socioeconomic status
in England
The impactof thegovernment’s recent reformsonequityand
quality is also not well documented
WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS
The reforms have not had a deleterious impact on the equity
of waiting times for elective surgery in England
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